Is there a risk of incoherence in an autonomous public agency?
By: TESTARMATA, Silvia
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Contributor(s): BRUNELLI, Sandro | GIOSI, Alessandro.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: Philadelphia : Routledge, sept. 2010Subject(s): Agência Reguladora | Governança | Política | Prestação de Contas | EuropaInternational Journal of Public Administration - IJPA 33, 11, p. 521-528Abstract: The diffusion of public agencies seems to characterize the European approach to public management. We analyze the governance mechanisms and, according to agency theory, the related accountability requirements in order to investigate if there is a conflict between public agency autonomy and political targets achievement. According to a multiple case study analysis, we consider three Italian public agencies: the Revenue Agency (AE), Social Security National Institute (INPS), and National Procurement Agency (CONSIP). Thus, we propose a model highlighting, for each public agency, the factors that are crucial to verify both the decision-making autonomy and coherence with public policy
The diffusion of public agencies seems to characterize the European approach to public management. We analyze the governance mechanisms and, according to agency theory, the related accountability requirements in order to investigate if there is a conflict between public agency autonomy and political targets achievement. According to a multiple case study analysis, we consider three Italian public agencies: the Revenue Agency (AE), Social Security National Institute (INPS), and National Procurement Agency (CONSIP). Thus, we propose a model highlighting, for each public agency, the factors that are crucial to verify both the decision-making autonomy and coherence with public policy
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